Richard Broinowski writes:

<blockquote>
Michael Angwin believes
that the 'normalisation' of Australian uranium policy is almost
complete, and that uranium should be dealt with like any other
Australian resource. He misses the rather salient point that uranium
exports can never be 'normalised' because unlike any other natural
mineral except thorium, uranium makes nuclear weapons. Strict safeguards
should attach to every shipment, and customers should be carefully
vetted as to their motives in buying it.



He also believes that uranium has become a good
ambassador, a platform for building Australia's relationship within our
region and beyond. But the only neighbour for which Australian uranium
may prove to have had any kind of relation-building role is India,
because New Delhi has said as much. Or more accurately, it has
blackmailed Canberra by asserting that if we don't sell it our uranium, bilateral relations will suffer. To my knowledge, no other customer country has ever made such a claim.




</blockquote>

<blockquote>
To the contrary, most have said that if Australia tries to impose
overly strict safeguards, they will source their uranium elsewhere.
There is plenty around.

</blockquote>
<blockquote>
Michael seems to base his optimistic forecasts about uranium exports
on the belief that there is an ever-expanding international nuclear
power industry. But his predictions verge on fantasy. Even before the
disaster at Fukushima, world appetite for uranium had been shrinking as
the global fleet retracts.




Equally fanciful is his claim that state political parties in
Australia are being elected on pro-uranium platforms. Where is the proof
for such contentious assertions? Pro-uranium mining policies don't win
elections. The intention to allow new uranium mines to open are usually
slipped in among other policy initiatives that have more immediacy.
Elections are won either because of the attraction of more urgent bread
and butter policies that appeal to the voters' hip pocket nerve, or
because the electorate simply wants to turf out an opposition it has
grown tired of. Meanwhile, any pro-mining support by political parties
is very carefully distinguished from any suggestion that Australia
should develop its own nuclear power industry, for that would be the
kiss of political death.





Michael refers to Australia's agreement to sell
uranium to the UAE, a potential proliferation risk if ever there was
one. Going against a world-wide disinclination to follow the nuclear
path, the UAE recently contracted to purchase four 1000 MW reactors from
South Korea on a turn-key basis. At a recent Lowy luncheon, former
United States Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk said that if Iran got
the bomb, there would be rapid regional nuclear proliferation. Where
would countries like Saudi Arabia get their bombs? From Pakistan. And
where would Saudi Arabia get its plutonium? Very likely from the
irradiated fuel from UAE reactors. Egypt and Turkey would not be far
behind.




مايكل يشير إلى اتفاق أستراليا لبيع اليورانيوم إلى الإمارات العربية المتحدة، والمخاطر المحتملة الانتشار إذا ما كان هناك واحد. تسير ضد ابتعاد في جميع أنحاء العالم لمتابعة مسار النووية، تعاقدت دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة مؤخرا لشراء أربعة مفاعلات 1000 ميجاوات من كوريا الجنوبية على أساس تسليم المفتاح. في مأدبة غداء لوي الأخيرة، قال سفير الولايات المتحدة السابق لدى إسرائيل مارتن إنديك أنه إذا حصلت إيران على القنبلة، لن يكون هناك الانتشار النووي الإقليمي السريع. من اين تحصل دول مثل المملكة العربية السعودية الحصول على قنابلهم؟ من باكستان. ومن اين تحصل المملكة العربية السعودية الحصول على البلوتونيوم؟ من المرجح جدا من الوقود المشع من المفاعل الإمارات العربية المتحدة. وان مصر وتركيا لن تكون بعيدة من الحصول عليه



So, rather than being a normal Australian mineral export, uranium has
all sorts of political and security ramifications, which Michael Angwin
chooses to ignore. It is precisely the kinds of rationalisations he
makes that have over the years persuaded successive Australian
governments to attenuate what started out in 1977 to be fairly strict
safeguards. The latest of these is to agree to sell uranium to India, a
non-signatory to the NPT. The consequences of this are yet to be felt.
They could be disastrous.





http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/05/27/Reader-riposte-Normalisation-of-uranium.aspx



تاريخ الموضوع :



by Reader riposte
-
18 رجب 1434 9:04ص


التقييم يا اخوان

تحياتي للجميع



</blockquote>

شيء معروف السعودية راح تحصل على النووي بشكل سريع لو حصلت ايران علية و اخواننا المصريين الان جالسين تعاونون مع الصينيين لبناء مفعل نووي يعني مصر السعودية دولتان نوويتان قريبا بأذن الله

وخذ تقييم يا الغالي