اقتباس :

In discussing the reaction to the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action, referred to by the Persian acronym Barjam ,
predicting the next move of key regional powers—notably
Egypt—has been particularly difficult for proliferation
scholars. As mentioned in my previous analysis , Israel and
Saudi Arabia offered guarded acceptance of the deal, but
reserved the right to reevaluate their decision should Iran
fail to comply with the deal.
Israel has used an array of strategies to roll back Iran’s
program, but it has not launched a preemptive attack on
Iranian facilities because of intense divisions between the
civilian and military leadership and a failure to secure
American support. Saudi Arabia, a country that could have
been expected to launch its own nuclear military program,
according to the security model of proliferation, seems to
have taken a low-key approach. The kingdom, under
pressure from the United States, reluctantly accepted the
JCPOA, but has worked on creating a hedging strategy
should Iran abrogate the agreement.
Like Israel and Saudi Arabia, Egypt offered guarded
acceptance, but reserved the right to reevaluate its decision
should Iran fail to comply with the deal. Egypt has had a
stormy relation with the Iranian regime. The two countries
broke off diplomatic relations in 1979 and, despite several
attempts at reconciliation, notably during the period of
President Hosni Mubarak, they only resumed relations under
President Mohamed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood in
2011. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who replaced Morsi in
2014, has been much more critical. He has blamed Tehran
for aiding the violent Muslim Brotherhood resistance and for
helping to destabilize the Sinai Desert through the Iran-
aligned Hamas forces in Gaza. Echoing Saudi grievances,
Egyptian officials described Iran’s involvement in Yemen as
not helpful.
Egypt’s attitude toward Tehran’s nuclear project has
differed from that of Saudi Arabia and Israel in ways that
make it complex and occasionally contradictory. Egypt’s
ambivalence toward nuclear energy in general and nuclear
weapons in particular goes a long way toward explaining
this complexity. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who became
president in 1954, was among the first Middle East leaders
to consider nuclear power. He created the Egyptian Atomic
Energy Commission in 1954, which is currently known as
the Atomic Energy Authority, and negotiated a number of
agreements with the Soviet Union, under which Egypt
received the ETRR-1 two-megawatt light-water research
reactor, located in Inshas.
After Israel unveiled the Dimona reactor in December 1961,
Nasser stepped up its nuclear rhetoric. He announced that
should Israel acquire nuclear weapons, “we would secure
atomic weapons at any cost.” Indeed, Egypt tried to buy a
heavy water–moderated reactor capable of producing
plutonium, an alternative to the more arduous process of
enriching uranium to weapon grade used in nuclear
weapons. Reports at the time indicated that Nasser wanted
the Soviet Union, China or India to supply Egypt with nuclear
weapons. In line with his growing pan-Arabism, Nasser
envisioned a pan-Arab nuclear force led by Egypt. The
devastating loss in the Six-Day War in 1967, however, put
Egypt’s nuclear ambition on pose.
Neither President Anwar Sadat nor Hosni Mubarak, who
succeeded him in 1981, were nuclear enthusiasts. As a
matter of fact, the Mubarak administration was even
lukewarm toward civilian nuclear technology. After a
number of failed attempts, following the 1986 Chernobyl
nuclear disaster, negotiations to buy a nuclear reactor were
terminated. Instead, in 1992 Egypt bought the ETRR-2
twenty-two-megawatt light-water reactor, which operates in
the Nuclear Research Center in Inshas. According to the
Nuclear Threat Initiative , Egypt experimented with uranium
conversion and also the reprocessing of uranium and
thorium. A storage facility in Inshas is said to contain three
kilograms of uranium metal, some sixty-seven kilograms of
imported uranium tetrafluoride, 9.4 kilograms of thorium
compounds, one kilogram of uranium rods enriched to 10
percent, and very small quantities of domestically fabricated
UF2, UF3 and UF4. Egypt imported most of the materials
before joining the NPT, but failed to report them at the time.
In addition, Egypt carried out experiments in nuclear
reprocessing in a two-stage process. First, natural uranium
was irradiated in its ETRR-1 and ETRR-2 research reactors.
Second, the irradiated material was dissolved in nitric acid,
which, as a rule, is used to recover plutonium-239. Nuclear
reprocessing is controversial, because plutonium-239 is
fissile and can be used to create an atomic bomb. Egypt
denied that the process involved plutonium, but the IAEA
cited Egypt for failing to declare the experiments in 2004.
Having decided that acquiring nuclear weapons was
prohibitive for economic and political reasons, Egypt, which
joined the NPT in 1980, decided to push for a Middle East
Nuclear-Free Zone. Mubarak embraced this idea and made
it the so-called WMD-Free Zone, the core of Egyptian
nuclear policy. The subsequently renamed Middle East
Nuclear Weapons–Free Zone (MENWFZ) movement became
a major irritant in relations between Cairo and Jerusalem.
Israel has not joined the NPT, and never acknowledged its
arsenal. Known as ambiguity (amimut ), this posture was a
low-cost strategy to develop nuclear weapons without the
censure of the international community. As a matter of fact,
in the 1970s, the United States committed itself to shield
Israel from pressure to join the NPT. But MENWFZ
challenged this arrangement and the Egyptians pushed the
United Nations to take up the initiative at the 1990 General
Assembly meeting. During the 1995 NPT Review
Conference, Egyptian representatives agreed to vote for the
extension of the treaty in return for a promise to convene a
separate meeting to discuss the Free Zone. Mohamed
ElBaradei, the Egyptian diplomat who helmed the IAEA
between 1997 and 2009, strongly encouraged this move. In
his view, Western countries engaged in rank hypocrisy by
turning a blind eye to Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal
and its attack on the Syrian reactor in 2007, while harassing
Iran. The nuclear chief was pleased with Egypt and other
states in the Arab group that objected to the American drive
to impose sanctions on Iran.
He also supported Egypt’s continued efforts to convene a
special conference on a nuclear-free zone, which was
backed by Tehran. During a high-profile visit to Washington
in September 2006, former president Mohammad Khatami
called for denuclearizing the Middle East. On September 17,
2009, Egypt and Iran scored a victory when the General
Assembly of the IAEA passed a resolution calling on Israel
to join the NPT and open its program for inspection. The
companion resolution was a first-of-its-kind appeal for a
Nuclear Weapons–Free Zone in the Middle East.
Egypt’s behavior was meant to constitute a point of
misdirection—“ the more Iran pursues nuclear capabilities,
the more Cairo rails against Israel’s Bomb
.” But for the Egyptians, the attack on the Syrian reactor in
2007 was conclusive proof of the double standards that
ElBaradei had railed against. Al Ahram denounced “the
synchronized silence of the Arab world” and castigated
other countries for ignoring the attack on a sovereign
country. Egypt registered its protest by voting against
sanctions on Iran during the 2009 meeting of the IAEA Board
of Governors.
As the leader of the 118-nation Non-Aligned Movement and
the New Agenda Coalition—a group of eight influential
countries, including Brazil and South Africa—Egypt has
occupied a special position in shaping the nuclear agenda.
Teaming up with Iran, it compelled the 2010 NPT Review
conference to call for a special meeting in 2012 to discuss a
regional WMD ban. Finland agreed to host the initiative, but,
in November 2012, the United States intervened to postpone
the gathering. America’s maneuvering outraged Egypt,
where the MENWFZ has commanded substantial public
support. According to a 2015 poll, 61 percent of the
Egyptian public supported Iran’s right to nuclear weapons,
even as 87 percent said Egypt should be developing its own
arsenal. With 65 percent of the respondents lauding Morsi’s
decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with Tehran, the
poll also revealed Iran’s growing popularity in Egypt. After
being declared in compliance of the NPT in January 2016, Iran has joined Egypt to push for a new conference, a stand that found support in the European Union and beyond.

يعني من الممكن مصر تحاول بناء منشئات نوويه او شي من هذا القبيل ؟ 
اذا هذا هو القصد!
  مصر من حقها ان تبني منشئات نوويه علي اراضيها و ماله دخل من بعيد او قريب بايران او دول الغربيه و اتفاقهم مع برنامج النووي الايراني نفس الشي السعودية من حقها بناء منشئات نوويه علي ارضيها

هذا لأن مصر و كما قال الرئيس في حوار سابق ليس لها أي موقف عدائي من ايران الا بسبب معاداة ايران لدول حليفة لمصر و مفتاح اعادة العلاقات بين ايران و مصر هي عبر اصلاح علاقة الأولى مع الخليج.