دي صورة تبين سيطرة الدفاع الجوي علي سماء مصر بالكامل
والصورة دي تبين ان فعلا الدفاع الجوي المصري معقد للغاية
الدواير الحمرا دي سام 2 والدواير الزرقا دي سام 3


المصدر
http://geimint.blogspot.com/search?q=egypt

بالفعل الدفاع الجوي يغطي كل شبر في مصر خاصا القاهرة

ماهي الى صورة على ورق

اخى لو الصوره دى واقعيه يبقى شمال الدلتا والاسكندريه بدون دفاع جوى بامانه صوره اطفال

مشمش_عبدو كتب:

وفين الصعيد رغم ان المنيا فيها اساسا مركز دفاع جوي ومطار حربي

اخي الصعيد مؤمن تماما ضد اي اعتداء خاصا اسوان

فعلا

eslam way كتب:

اخى لو الصوره دى واقعيه يبقى شمال الدلتا والاسكندريه بدون دفاع جوى بامانه صوره اطفال

ادخل علي الرابط وانتا تعرف ان ده عبارة عن الدفاع الجوي لشمال شرق مصر
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active
S-125 sites (blue) and S-75 sites (red) around the metropolitan areas of
northeastern Egypt:
وادي الرابط كمان مرة
http://geimint.blogspot.com/search?q=egypt

مشمش_عبدو كتب:

وفين الصعيد رغم ان المنيا فيها اساسا مركز دفاع جوي ومطار حربي

الصورة دي عبارة عن الدفاع الجوي لشمال شرق مصر
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active
S-125 sites (blue) and S-75 sites (red) around the metropolitan areas of
northeastern Egypt

مشمش_عبدو كتب:

الرابط مش شغال

ازاي مش شغال
وادي الرابط كمان مرة شوفو كدة
http://geimint.blogspot.com/search?q=egypt

حضراتك مدينى رابط شبكه الدفاع الليبيه



INTRODUCTION

Libya possesses one of the most robust air defense networks on the African continent, falling second only to Egypt in terms of coverage and operational systems. Libyan strategic SAM assets are primarily arrayed along the coastline, ostensibly defending the bulk of the Libyan population and preventing foreign incursion into Libyan airspace.

THE STRATEGIC SAM FORCE

Libyan strategic SAM assets are subordinate to the Air Defense Forces, which in turn are subordinate to the Libyan Air Force. Currently believed to be divided into five separate regional commands, the Air Defense Force operates a variety of Soviet-era equipment. The following strategic SAM systems are currently serving within the Libyan Air Defense Force: S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON).

EW Coverage

Seventeen active and four inactive EW sites provide Libya's military with early warning radar coverage, used for SAM system target acquisition and track handoff, and GCI control of fighter units. These EW sites are located primarily along the western and eastern coastal regions, monitoring the airspace around Tripoli and Benghazi. Identified EW radars operating in Libya are predominately Soviet-era systems. The following systems have been identified in available imagery:

P-12/18 (SPOON REST)
P-14 (TALL KING)
P-35/37 (BAR LOCK)
P-80 (BACK NET)

In addition, Libya is reported to have received five Italian LPD-20 air search radars in 1983 and three Soviet 5N69 (BIG BACK) EW radars between 1984 and 1985. None of these systems have been identified in available imagery, but that does not preclude their existance.

The following image depicts the locations of identified EW radar sites in Libya:
The following image depicts a notional Libyan EW site, located near Sabha in the western portion of the nation's interior. This is representative of roughly one third of Libya's EW sites. Five sites are only fitted with P-12/18 series radars, with five being fitted with multiple radar systems. The P-12/18 sites likely serve to bolster or extend coverage, with the five sites containing multiple EW radars possibly serving as the command centers for the aforementioned regional commands.
Some strategic SAM sites contain their own organic EW elements. This allows them to perform independent target acquisition, or to accept long-range track handoff from regional EW centers. Seven SAM sites, four S-75 and three S-200, have identified EW assets. S-75 sites feature P-12/18 radars, with S-200 sites featuring P-14 radars. No S-125 sites, and the remaining S-75 and S-200 sites, contain identified EW assets, but this is likely due to the quality of available imagery rather than a lack of assets.

The following image depicts a deployed P-12/18 EW radar at an S-75 site near Tripoli:
SAM Coverage

There are currently thirty one active strategic SAM sites located in Libya. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. S-75 sites are red, S-125 sites are light blue, and S-200 sites are purple. As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of the deployed strategic SAM assets are located along the same coastal regions featuring the bulk of the EW assets.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by the identified Libyan strategic SAM sites. Using the same color scheme applied previously, SA-2 zones are red, S-125 zones are light blue, and S-200 zones are purple.
S-75

There are currently eleven active S-75 sites inside of Libya, constituting roughly one third of the strategic SAM force. Russian sources claim that thirty nine S-75M Volkhov batteries were supplied to Libya between 1974 and 1985. Other sources suggest that the initial order of eighteen batteries supplied between 1974 and 1975 consisted of S-75 Dvina systems. S-75 batteries are deployed to protect key population centers and military facilities, predominately along the coastal region.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-75 batteries:
S-125

There are currently sixteen active S-125 sites inside of Libya. Eight batteries are situated on former S-75 sites. The S-125 represents half of the deployed strategic SAM assets in the nation. Libya operates the S-125M Neva-M variant, with thirty three batteries being supplied between 1974 and 1976. As with the S-75, S-125 batteries are deployed to protect key population and military facilities, predominately along the coastal region.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-125 batteries:
S-200

There are currently four active S-200 sites inside of Libya, each site being equipped with two batteries. The S-200 represents the longest-range strategic SAM system in the Libyan arsenal. The proximity of these four locations to the coastline allows them to range far out into the Mediterranean, theoretically providing a significant standoff engagement capability. Six S-200 batteries were initially supplied to Libya between 1985 and 1986, with a further five being delivered in 1988. There is some confusion as to which variant Libya operates. Russian sources refer to the system delivered as the S-200VE, but the SIPRI arms trade register refers to the system as the Angara, implying that the longer-range S-200DE was delivered.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-200 batteries. A range of 300 kilometers is used, corresponding to the Angara variant.
Tactical SAM Systems

The Libyan Army operates various tactical SAM ssytems which could be called upon to provide point defense of serve as gap fillers in the overall air defense network. These systems include the 2K12 Kvadrat (SA-6 GAINFUL), 9K33 Osa (SA-8 GECKO), 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 GASKIN), 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 GOPHER), and Crotale. While the 9K33 is the most numerous system, the 2K12 represents the msot capable tactical SAM system.

Inactive Sites

There are currently thirty identified inactive strategic SAM sites located in Libya. There are fifteen S-75 sites, eleven S-125 sites, and four S-200 sites. These sites are all located within areas featuring active SAM batteries. As such, they may represent facilities available for bolstering the defenses of a given region during hostilities, drawing on equipment held in garrison, or they may represent dispersal locations for the realignment of SAM deployments over time.

To support the latter concept, it should be noted that five inactive sites, two S-75, one S-125, and two S-200, have hosted operational batteries at some point in the past. Also, three S-125 and one S-200 site currently operational were noted as being inactive at some point in the past. This suggests that there is a policy of redeployment and reorganization that occurs. Militarily this is a sound strategy, as it complicates the targeting of these facilities by a potential aggressor. While it is true that new site locations can be deduced by imagery or ELNT analysis, it adds to the workload of pre-strike planners.

The following image depicts the locations of inactive strategic SAM sites located in Libya:
Support Facilities

Eleven facilities provide logistical support for the overall strategic SAM network. Ten of these facilities are SAM garrisons housing undeployed equipment and missile reloads, with the remaining facility being a dedicated SAM training complex. Seven of the SAM garrisons are generic facilities supporting multiple systems. Based on the identification of system components in available imagery, two of the remaining SAM garrisons appear to solely support the S-75, with the remaining garrison supporting the S-125. All garrisons are located in the vicinity of prepared launch sites.

The following image depicts a combined S-75/125 garrison complex near Tripoli:
The following image depicts the Libyan SAM training complex near Misratah:
STRATEGIC SAM FORCE CAPABILITY

Libyan strategic SAM assets are arranged to provide a layered air defense zone with overlapping fields of fire. S-75 and S-125 batteries are located in close proximity to provide both redundancy and support, with the S-125 being more capable at lower altitudes than the S-75. The large number of inactive sites suggests that the force has been drawn down over time. This could be due to service life issues, equipment failure, financial reasons, or the expenditure of missile stocks.

National S-200 Coverage

The first line of defense in Libya's strategic SAM network is the S-200. Positioned along the coastline, the four active S-200 batteries provide a credible deterrent to high-RCS cooperative targets such as ISR platforms. S-200 batteries are located near Tripoli, Misratah, Surt, and Benghazi.

Coastal Coverage

Libya's S-75 and S-125 sites are concentrated primarily along the western and eastern coastlines. While the S-200 batteries are situated to provide barrier air defense of the nation's coastline, the S-75 and S-125 sites are positioned to provide point defense of assigned areas. From west to east, these sites are arrayed around Ibn Nafa airbase, Tripoli, Misratah, Benghazi, Bombah, and Adam. While contiguous coverage of the coastal region is not provided by these sites, each location is defended by no fewer than three batteries. Ibn Nafa and Bombah are defended by one S-75 and two S-125 batteries, Misratah is defended by one S-75 and three S-125 batteries, and Benghazi and Adam are defended by two S-75 and two S-125 batteries.

The following image depicts the coastal coverage of Libya's S-75 and S-125 batteries, with the locations of the S-200 batteries also marked:
Interestingly, while Surt features an active S-200 battery, all S-75 and S-125 sites in the area are currently inactive. This leaves the coastline along the Gulf of Sidra relatively undefended.

The most heavily defended city is the capitol of Tripoli. Tripoli is defended by three S-75 and four S-125 batteries, with an S-200 battery positioned south of the city. Three SAM garrisons and three EW facilities are also present in the area, as are four inactive SAM sites.

The following image depicts SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near Tripoli:
The following images depict SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near the remaining coastal areas.

Ibn Nafa Airbase
Misratah
Benghazi
Bombah
Adam
Inland Coverage

Sabha is the only inland city within Libya to have any strategic SAM defenses. Much of the Libyan interior is sparsely populated, as are the regions it borders. What then makes Sabha stand out as a location requiring SAM defenses? First, Sabha is believed to have been associated with the defunct Libyan nuclear weapons program. Second, Sabha was home to Libyan rocket development in the early 1980s, when the OTRAG rocket was tested from the Seba Oasis launch facility. There remains a significant military presence in the area, which is likely the ultimate reason for the presence of strategic SAM assets and related support facilities.

The following image depicts SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near Sebha:
Air Defense Issues

Libya's strategic SAM network is logically arrayed to defend key facilities following a point defense strategy, with long-range S-200 systems providing standoff barrier air defense along the coastal region. However, Libya's strategic SAM network has many flaws.

The main drawback of the Libyan strategic SAM network is an overreliance on aging Soviet technology. Russian manufacturers presently produce what are arguably the most advanced and capable land-based strategic SAM systems in the world. Much of their success lies in the fact that they have produced a diverse array of SAM systems with numerous variants. However, this history also presents a problem for nations relying on older technology: the rest of the world has simply passed them by. Advances in electronic warfare and ECM have made many of the older Soviet-era SAM systems obsolete in a modern air combat environment. Libya's S-75, S-125, and S-200 systems are no exception. Furthermore, despite some claims to the contrary, the Libyan strategic SAM force was generally ineffective during hostilities with the United States in the mid 1980s.

In one case, Soviet military officials deduced that the S-200 succeeded in downing three US Navy aircraft in March of 1986, based only on the perception of fragments on the radar readouts and the presence of helicopter activity in the area, the latter being attributed to CSAR efforts. The USN has never disclosed any aircraft losses during the incident, which in and of itself does not indicate that no aircraft were lost, but the other two pieces of "evidence" can easily be explained. The apparent appearance of aircraft fragments on the radar operators' screens could have been attributed to chaff dispersal or radar interference, especially if the aircraft descended below the radar's field of view. Also, helicopter activity is not limited to CSAR operations in the USN; helicopters active at the time could have been performing anti-submarine patrols, searching out and identifying surface contacts, or simply flying proiciency sorties. Whatever the case may be, the evidence does not conclusively indicate that any USN aircraft were downed by S-200s, and if the Russians or Libyans have any evidence to the contrary they have certainly never seen fit to bring it into the open.

Later in 1986, the Libyan strategic SAM network was abused during Operation ELDORADO CANYON, the US military response to Libyan support of terrorism. Lieutenant General Vladimir Yaroshenko, a former officer in the Soviet PVO SAM Troops, was assigned to analyze

eslam way كتب:

حضراتك مدينى رابط شبكه الدفاع الليبيه



INTRODUCTION

Libya possesses one of the most robust air defense networks on the African continent, falling second only to Egypt in terms of coverage and operational systems. Libyan strategic SAM assets are primarily arrayed along the coastline, ostensibly defending the bulk of the Libyan population and preventing foreign incursion into Libyan airspace.

THE STRATEGIC SAM FORCE

Libyan strategic SAM assets are subordinate to the Air Defense Forces, which in turn are subordinate to the Libyan Air Force. Currently believed to be divided into five separate regional commands, the Air Defense Force operates a variety of Soviet-era equipment. The following strategic SAM systems are currently serving within the Libyan Air Defense Force: S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON).

EW Coverage

Seventeen active and four inactive EW sites provide Libya's military with early warning radar coverage, used for SAM system target acquisition and track handoff, and GCI control of fighter units. These EW sites are located primarily along the western and eastern coastal regions, monitoring the airspace around Tripoli and Benghazi. Identified EW radars operating in Libya are predominately Soviet-era systems. The following systems have been identified in available imagery:

P-12/18 (SPOON REST)
P-14 (TALL KING)
P-35/37 (BAR LOCK)
P-80 (BACK NET)

In addition, Libya is reported to have received five Italian LPD-20 air search radars in 1983 and three Soviet 5N69 (BIG BACK) EW radars between 1984 and 1985. None of these systems have been identified in available imagery, but that does not preclude their existance.

The following image depicts the locations of identified EW radar sites in Libya:
The following image depicts a notional Libyan EW site, located near Sabha in the western portion of the nation's interior. This is representative of roughly one third of Libya's EW sites. Five sites are only fitted with P-12/18 series radars, with five being fitted with multiple radar systems. The P-12/18 sites likely serve to bolster or extend coverage, with the five sites containing multiple EW radars possibly serving as the command centers for the aforementioned regional commands.
Some strategic SAM sites contain their own organic EW elements. This allows them to perform independent target acquisition, or to accept long-range track handoff from regional EW centers. Seven SAM sites, four S-75 and three S-200, have identified EW assets. S-75 sites feature P-12/18 radars, with S-200 sites featuring P-14 radars. No S-125 sites, and the remaining S-75 and S-200 sites, contain identified EW assets, but this is likely due to the quality of available imagery rather than a lack of assets.

The following image depicts a deployed P-12/18 EW radar at an S-75 site near Tripoli:
SAM Coverage

There are currently thirty one active strategic SAM sites located in Libya. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. S-75 sites are red, S-125 sites are light blue, and S-200 sites are purple. As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of the deployed strategic SAM assets are located along the same coastal regions featuring the bulk of the EW assets.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by the identified Libyan strategic SAM sites. Using the same color scheme applied previously, SA-2 zones are red, S-125 zones are light blue, and S-200 zones are purple.
S-75

There are currently eleven active S-75 sites inside of Libya, constituting roughly one third of the strategic SAM force. Russian sources claim that thirty nine S-75M Volkhov batteries were supplied to Libya between 1974 and 1985. Other sources suggest that the initial order of eighteen batteries supplied between 1974 and 1975 consisted of S-75 Dvina systems. S-75 batteries are deployed to protect key population centers and military facilities, predominately along the coastal region.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-75 batteries:
S-125

There are currently sixteen active S-125 sites inside of Libya. Eight batteries are situated on former S-75 sites. The S-125 represents half of the deployed strategic SAM assets in the nation. Libya operates the S-125M Neva-M variant, with thirty three batteries being supplied between 1974 and 1976. As with the S-75, S-125 batteries are deployed to protect key population and military facilities, predominately along the coastal region.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-125 batteries:
S-200

There are currently four active S-200 sites inside of Libya, each site being equipped with two batteries. The S-200 represents the longest-range strategic SAM system in the Libyan arsenal. The proximity of these four locations to the coastline allows them to range far out into the Mediterranean, theoretically providing a significant standoff engagement capability. Six S-200 batteries were initially supplied to Libya between 1985 and 1986, with a further five being delivered in 1988. There is some confusion as to which variant Libya operates. Russian sources refer to the system delivered as the S-200VE, but the SIPRI arms trade register refers to the system as the Angara, implying that the longer-range S-200DE was delivered.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-200 batteries. A range of 300 kilometers is used, corresponding to the Angara variant.
Tactical SAM Systems

The Libyan Army operates various tactical SAM ssytems which could be called upon to provide point defense of serve as gap fillers in the overall air defense network. These systems include the 2K12 Kvadrat (SA-6 GAINFUL), 9K33 Osa (SA-8 GECKO), 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 GASKIN), 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 GOPHER), and Crotale. While the 9K33 is the most numerous system, the 2K12 represents the msot capable tactical SAM system.

Inactive Sites

There are currently thirty identified inactive strategic SAM sites located in Libya. There are fifteen S-75 sites, eleven S-125 sites, and four S-200 sites. These sites are all located within areas featuring active SAM batteries. As such, they may represent facilities available for bolstering the defenses of a given region during hostilities, drawing on equipment held in garrison, or they may represent dispersal locations for the realignment of SAM deployments over time.

To support the latter concept, it should be noted that five inactive sites, two S-75, one S-125, and two S-200, have hosted operational batteries at some point in the past. Also, three S-125 and one S-200 site currently operational were noted as being inactive at some point in the past. This suggests that there is a policy of redeployment and reorganization that occurs. Militarily this is a sound strategy, as it complicates the targeting of these facilities by a potential aggressor. While it is true that new site locations can be deduced by imagery or ELNT analysis, it adds to the workload of pre-strike planners.

The following image depicts the locations of inactive strategic SAM sites located in Libya:
Support Facilities

Eleven facilities provide logistical support for the overall strategic SAM network. Ten of these facilities are SAM garrisons housing undeployed equipment and missile reloads, with the remaining facility being a dedicated SAM training complex. Seven of the SAM garrisons are generic facilities supporting multiple systems. Based on the identification of system components in available imagery, two of the remaining SAM garrisons appear to solely support the S-75, with the remaining garrison supporting the S-125. All garrisons are located in the vicinity of prepared launch sites.

The following image depicts a combined S-75/125 garrison complex near Tripoli:
The following image depicts the Libyan SAM training complex near Misratah:
STRATEGIC SAM FORCE CAPABILITY

Libyan strategic SAM assets are arranged to provide a layered air defense zone with overlapping fields of fire. S-75 and S-125 batteries are located in close proximity to provide both redundancy and support, with the S-125 being more capable at lower altitudes than the S-75. The large number of inactive sites suggests that the force has been drawn down over time. This could be due to service life issues, equipment failure, financial reasons, or the expenditure of missile stocks.

National S-200 Coverage

The first line of defense in Libya's strategic SAM network is the S-200. Positioned along the coastline, the four active S-200 batteries provide a credible deterrent to high-RCS cooperative targets such as ISR platforms. S-200 batteries are located near Tripoli, Misratah, Surt, and Benghazi.

Coastal Coverage

Libya's S-75 and S-125 sites are concentrated primarily along the western and eastern coastlines. While the S-200 batteries are situated to provide barrier air defense of the nation's coastline, the S-75 and S-125 sites are positioned to provide point defense of assigned areas. From west to east, these sites are arrayed around Ibn Nafa airbase, Tripoli, Misratah, Benghazi, Bombah, and Adam. While contiguous coverage of the coastal region is not provided by these sites, each location is defended by no fewer than three batteries. Ibn Nafa and Bombah are defended by one S-75 and two S-125 batteries, Misratah is defended by one S-75 and three S-125 batteries, and Benghazi and Adam are defended by two S-75 and two S-125 batteries.

The following image depicts the coastal coverage of Libya's S-75 and S-125 batteries, with the locations of the S-200 batteries also marked:
Interestingly, while Surt features an active S-200 battery, all S-75 and S-125 sites in the area are currently inactive. This leaves the coastline along the Gulf of Sidra relatively undefended.

The most heavily defended city is the capitol of Tripoli. Tripoli is defended by three S-75 and four S-125 batteries, with an S-200 battery positioned south of the city. Three SAM garrisons and three EW facilities are also present in the area, as are four inactive SAM sites.

The following image depicts SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near Tripoli:
The following images depict SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near the remaining coastal areas.

Ibn Nafa Airbase
Misratah
Benghazi
Bombah
Adam
Inland Coverage

Sabha is the only inland city within Libya to have any strategic SAM defenses. Much of the Libyan interior is sparsely populated, as are the regions it borders. What then makes Sabha stand out as a location requiring SAM defenses? First, Sabha is believed to have been associated with the defunct Libyan nuclear weapons program. Second, Sabha was home to Libyan rocket development in the early 1980s, when the OTRAG rocket was tested from the Seba Oasis launch facility. There remains a significant military presence in the area, which is likely the ultimate reason for the presence of strategic SAM assets and related support facilities.

The following image depicts SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near Sebha:
Air Defense Issues

Libya's strategic SAM network is logically arrayed to defend key facilities following a point defense strategy, with long-range S-200 systems providing standoff barrier air defense along the coastal region. However, Libya's strategic SAM network has many flaws.

The main drawback of the Libyan strategic SAM network is an overreliance on aging Soviet technology. Russian manufacturers presently produce what are arguably the most advanced and capable land-based strategic SAM systems in the world. Much of their success lies in the fact that they have produced a diverse array of SAM systems with numerous variants. However, this history also presents a problem for nations relying on older technology: the rest of the world has simply passed them by. Advances in electronic warfare and ECM have made many of the older Soviet-era SAM systems obsolete in a modern air combat environment. Libya's S-75, S-125, and S-200 systems are no exception. Furthermore, despite some claims to the contrary, the Libyan strategic SAM force was generally ineffective during hostilities with the United States in the mid 1980s.

In one case, Soviet military officials deduced that the S-200 succeeded in downing three US Navy aircraft in March of 1986, based only on the perception of fragments on the radar readouts and the presence of helicopter activity in the area, the latter being attributed to CSAR efforts. The USN has never disclosed any aircraft losses during the incident, which in and of itself does not indicate that no aircraft were lost, but the other two pieces of "evidence" can easily be explained. The apparent appearance of aircraft fragments on the radar operators' screens could have been attributed to chaff dispersal or radar interference, especially if the aircraft descended below the radar's field of view. Also, helicopter activity is not limited to CSAR operations in the USN; helicopters active at the time could have been performing anti-submarine patrols, searching out and identifying surface contacts, or simply flying proiciency sorties. Whatever the case may be, the evidence does not conclusively indicate that any USN aircraft were downed by S-200s, and if the Russians or Libyans have any evidence to the contrary they have certainly never seen fit to bring it into the open.

Later in 1986, the Libyan strategic SAM network was abused during Operation ELDORADO CANYON, the US military response to Libyan support of terrorism. Lieutenant General Vladimir Yaroshenko, a former officer in the Soviet PVO SAM Troops, was assigned to analyze

الرابط فعلا بيتكلم عن ليبا
بس لو نزلت تحت هتلاقية بيتكلم في الصورة اللي انا حاتطها دي عن شمال شرق مصر وتغطية سام 2 وسام 3 ليهم
Given the relatively short range of the S-125 SAM system, most nations
commonly employ them as short-range systems complementing longer-range
systems such as the S-75 that the system was originally designed to
complement.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by
identified active S-125 sites (blue) and S-75 sites (red) around the
metropolitan areas of northeastern Egypt :

[quote="litoo11oo"]دي صورة تبين سيطرة الدفاع الجوي علي سماء مصر بالكامل
والصورة دي تبين ان فعلا الدفاع الجوي المصري معقد للغاية
الدواير الحمرا دي سام 2 والدواير الزرقا دي سام 3


المصدر
http://geimint.blogspot.com/search?q=egypt[/qu



اهو دا بقى اللى فوتو شوب

يجدعان جيش مصر عنده شبكه دفاعيه من اقوى الشبكات الدفاعيه للعالم وحضرتك مش محطوط معاهم امون ولا باتروت يعنى اللى هيفكر يقرب هيدمر